Showing posts with label database state. Show all posts
Showing posts with label database state. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 06, 2009

NewsBiscuit: Campaigners call for national register of MPs

This spoof made me laugh:

Recent research has estimated the number of MPs in the UK as at least 646, causing many to worry that political activity could be happening on their doorsteps.

Campaign leader Michael Carlisle explained ‘These people are by nature devious and evasive. They will never give a straight answer to a question; they mislead the public, claim inflated expenses, send malicious emails and very rarely show any sense of remorse. We need protecting from these people, if you can call them that. The public has a right to know if one is living in the middle of their community.’

And:
Another possibility being considered is thought to be a watered down version of the scheme whereby individuals can check the register to see if prospective partners are MPs before moving in with them. One man, who wanted to remain anonymous, agreed ‘I’d never have moved in with my partner if I’d known she was a politician, or at least I’d have made sure I didn’t claim for porn on her expense account.’

Sunday, March 01, 2009

British Readers: Write to your MPs

Phil Booth of NO2ID, quoted by Guy Herbert on Samizdata:

At the Convention on Modern Liberty, I launched NO2ID's request that everyone at the convention – and around the UK – tells their MP right now that they refuse their consent to having their information shared under any "information sharing order", a power currently being slipped onto the statute books in clause 152 of the coroners and justice bill .

Please tell yours too. It's important, and urgent – and something that only YOU can do. If you never have before, now's the time to write to your MP – in a letter, or via www.WriteToThem.com.

Jack Straw has been making noises that could signal a 'compromise', but the only acceptable action is to remove clause 152 entirely from the bill. It is not linked to any other clause, despite being sandwiched between other powers and so-called safeguards offered to the information commissioner. It cannot be improved, and Straw can't be allowed to merely "dilute" it. Clause 152 just has to go.

It's imperative that in coming days every MP hears from his or her constituents. Please tell them you refuse consent to having your information, taken for one purpose, arbitrarily used for any other purpose. And ask them to vote clause 152 off the bill.

I've done it, I urge anyone concerned about this measure to do it.

Saturday, January 10, 2009

NO2ID Video: Take Jane



This video highlights one of the problems that the National Identity Scheme(NIS) is likely to make worse.

Whilst the above scenario could happen (I think it is quite likely to happen), the following have happened and involve similar problems with existing government databases:

Many other examples can be found via this Magna Carta Plus article.

The NIS will make these problems worse by requiring people to register changes of address (on pain of penalties upto £1000), by storing data in one central database accessed by all public bodies and by facilitating the cross-linking and sharing of data by those public bodies.

Saturday, January 03, 2009

Convention on Modern Liberty: 28th February 2009

The Convention on Modern Liberty is a convention being organised for the 28th February 2009. To quote from the website:

"A call to all concerned with attacks on our fundamental rights and freedoms under pressure from counter-terrorism, financial breakdown and the database state"

This looks like it will be an interesting set of events, with conventions planned in London, Belfast, Birmingham, Cambridge, Glasgow, Manchester, Southampton and Swansea.

I'll post more news when I get it.

Saturday, February 17, 2007

NO2ID Comedy Gig in Glasgow

NO2ID, in conjunction with Ha Ha Comedy, are organising a comedy gig as part of the international comedy festival currently in progress in Glasgow, Scotland. It’s organised for the 24th March, 8pm, at the Old Fruitmarket. Tickets £10 or £8 for concessions.

See here for full details.

Update: Confirmed comedians for this event include: You owe me glue, Glen Wool, Patrick Monahan, Toby Hadoke, Des Maclean and Lucy Porter.

Tuesday, September 13, 2005

ID card roadshow in Edinburgh tomorrow

Apparently, the government's identity cards "roadshow", a charm offensive the govt is using to try to win over the public on the proposals, will be hitting Edinburgh tomorrow according to the Glasgow No2ID website:

On Sunday 11th September, it was announced that the Home Office would be starting a 7 day "biometric roadshow" to try to sell the concept of ID cards to the British public. The roadshow started today with Andy Burnham MP, minister for ID cards, visiting Manchester Airport on Monday to show off the Home Office's dreams for biometric technology - BBC story (appeared Sunday afternoon).

The Home Office are trying to keep news of these events secret before they occur. On Monday afternoon they flatly refused to let me know if there were any plans for the roadshow to come to Scotland. The Home Office did not make a press release about the Manchester event public until it had already started.

Despite the Home Office refusing to tell us about future dates and venues, we have learnt that the roadshow will be at the Gyle shopping centre in Edinburgh on Wednesday 14th September. Andy Burnham will be there from 11:00 to 12:00.

If you can possibly get to Edinburgh on Wednesday to join in a small protest, hand out a few leaflets and challenge a minister to answer some of the questions that they have been avoiding, then please let me know. Or just turn up, if you prefer.

Sorry about the short notice, but the Home Office are trying to keep this quiet. We need all the help we can get - please get in touch: glasgow@no2id.net


Sunday, July 24, 2005

New No2ID pledge

Following the success of the earlier No2ID pledge, a new pledge has been set up, aimed at those who are opposed to ID cards but feel they cannot incur the fines or possible jail sentences associated with refusing to get one. The new pledge reads:

I will actively support those people who, on behalf of all of us*, refuse to register for an ID card, and I pledge to pay at least £20 into a fighting fund for them but only if 50000 other people will too.
The originator of the pledge is a mother called Franky Ma, and as the website explains this pledge is aimed at those who for whatever reason feel that they can't join in a campaign of non-compliance directly:
"As the mother of a young child I can't risk her rights with mine by contesting ID cards directly, but I want to do everything I can to make sure she grows up in a free country." - Franky

*Many people, including Franky, have told NO2ID that they really want to refuse to register but they feel that their professional or family responsibilities mean they cannot personally contest registration--which could stop them travelling, working, and exercising many other civil rights.

The government's so-called 'voluntary' phase is a lie. Linking your passport to the National Identity Register and ID card WITH NO OPT-OUT is coercion, not choice. It may, in fact, prove to be a violation of human rights conventions.

NO2ID has already found over 10,000 people willing to test this--and the government's apparent intent to starve out the non-compliant. They will need your support.
The aim is to collect 50,000 signatures for this pledge by 31st March 2006. Given that they got 10,000 signatures for the earlier pledge in a matter of weeks, with a 9th October deadline, I'd suggest they've got a good chance of achieving this.

Monday, July 18, 2005

Over 10,000 pledge to resist human livestock bill

The Register reports that the No2ID pledge set up by Phil Booth, the No2ID National Coordinator has reached its target of 10,000 signatures with several months to go before the October 9th deadline. The pledge states:

"I will refuse to register for an ID card and will donate £10 to a legal defence fund but only if 10000 other people will also make this same pledge."
It was set up back in June, and has thus reached its target in under 2 months.

Sunday, June 05, 2005

The government's mass surveillance fetish

The British government seems to have a fetish for mass surveillance. Today it has announced plans to use satellite tracking of all motor vehicles as a means of road pricing:

Drivers could pay up to £1.34 a mile in "pay-as-you go" road charges under new government plans.

The transport secretary said the charges, aimed at cutting congestion, would replace road tax and petrol duty.

Alistair Darling said change was needed if the UK was to avoid the possibility of "LA-style gridlock" within 20 years.

Every vehicle would have a black box to allow a satellite system to track their journey, with prices starting from as little as 2p per mile in rural areas.

These plans have been in the offing for some time mind you. But it is in line with other proposals they've had that involve mass surveillance of everyone's activities:
Note that all this surveillance will be directed at the population as a whole, not merely those who the govt suspects of wrong doing.

Thursday, February 24, 2005

Scottish Parliament votes against Labour's ID cards plans

Today, on the basis of a motion put forward by the Scottish Green Party, Members of the Scottish Parliament voted, by a margin of 52 to 47, with 15 abstentions, against the govt's planned identity cards:

The Scottish Parliament has voted against UK Government plans to introduce identity cards.

The measures were branded "regressive" and a threat to personal freedom during a debate called by the Scottish Greens at Holyrood.

Labour insisted that the system would actually strengthen civil liberties.

MSPs rejected ID cards by 52 votes to 47 after the Green motion received cross-party support, although the matter is reserved to Westminster.

It should be noted that whilst the Parliament cannot oppose the measures outright, they can prevent the cards being required to use public services in Scotland and thus can minimise its impact.

None of the Scottish parties other than Labour could support this measure, not even the Tories who say they're in favour in principle.

The Lib Dems abstained, claiming that the motion did not go far enough in opposing ID cards outright, as opposed to the govt's specific plans. Whilst this was true, it seemed to me that defeat of the motion would have been a blow to the campaign against the cards and that a stronger motion would have seen the Tories oppose, thus making it likely the motion would be defeated.

Nevertheless, this is a welcome development for those opposed to the ID cards and the database associated with them. Thanks should go to the Scottish Green Party who gave up one of its few slots in the Parliament for this debate and the accompanying motion.

Now for the House of Lords...

Friday, January 21, 2005

Key features of the Identity Cards Bill

The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184 amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.

I shall summarise some of the key features of the bill here.

The National Identity Register(NIR)

Section 1 sets up the NIR, and together with Schedule 1 determines what information will be stored on it. The information to be stored includes:
  • a unique National Idenity Registration Number(NIRN) for each person in the NIR.
  • your date of birth, gender, full name and any other name you've had.
  • your current address plus every address you've ever lived at.
  • your photo, signature and biometric scans.
  • your residential status plus every previous residential status you've had.
  • details of any official identity documents issued to you,
  • the history of all changes made to your NIR record,
  • details of all ID cards issued to you, their validity, whether you've been ordered to surrender them, etc.
  • details of all the information you've provided to register on the NIR and to apply for/renew your ID cards.
  • details of every occasion on which the NIR entry has been accessed by others. Note that when it becomes necessary to have your ID card and NIR entry checked in order to access public services, this item will thus record your usage of those services, e.g. what medical services you've signed up for.

Access to the information on the NIR

Note that where the Home Secretary gets powers to issue orders, the orders must be approved by both Houses of Parliament, unless otherwise stated.

Section 14 allows the Home Secretary to disclose some of the information on your NIR entry to you, or to someone else acting on your behalf, for purposes of verification of the data if you apply to for such access. The information you can get includes:
  • your name, date of birth, addresses and gender.
  • your identifying numbers and the validity of your identifying documents.
  • your photo and signature.
  • whether biometric scans taken from you matched the ones recorded for you.
The information you can access under this section does NOT include the record of changes to your NIR entry or the record of who has accessed your NIR entry. However, section 14(8) does permit access to the NIR record using other legislation such as the Data Protection Act. It is thus not clear whether an individual can get access to the record of who has accessed their NIR entiry.

Section 17 gives the Home Secretary the power to allow a person providing a public service to access the NIR to verify your identity, where the person is also authorised to check your ID card before providing the service (see also Section 15 and 16).

Section 19 sets out which public authorities can access NIR information without your consent (see also Section 20):
  • MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (see the Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill) will get access to all of the information for the purposes of carrying out their functions.
  • The Police, Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, will get access to all the information, except the record of who has accessed the NIR, in the interests of national security, for preventing or detecting crime and for other purposes specified by order of the Home Secretary. In the case of the IR and C&E they also get access for carrying out their functions and investigating conduct that might incur the penalties they can enforce.
  • Government departments get access to all the information, except the record of who has accessed the NIR, where the Home Secretary prescribes it for the exercising/carrying out of any powers or duties the deparment has by virtue of the Bill or for the issuing/modification of official documents.
Section 22 gives the Home Secretary the power to disclose specified information to a specified individual for specified purposes, by order.

The obligations the bill imposes

Section 6 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel individuals matching a specified description to register on the NIR and get a card by order. Failure to comply incurs a civil penalty of upto £2500.

Section 11 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel any person, by order, to provide information for the purposes of verifying information recorded, or due to be recorded, in the NIR, if he believes the individual has that information in their possession.

Section 12 requires ID card holders to notify the Home Secretary of any changes of circumstances that affect their information on the NIR and any error they become aware of in their NIR entry. The card holders may be ordered to attend a specific place at a specific time and have biometric scans taken and to provide any information required by the Home Secretary. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty of upto £1,000 pounds.

Section 13 requires people to notify the Home Secretary if their card is lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. The Home Secretary can cancel a card if it appears to him to be lost, stolen, damaged, destroyed, tampered with, issued on the basis of incorrect or incomplete info, the NIR entry has been modified, a change of circumstances requires modification of the card or the card needs to be reissued.

A person in possession of someone else's card must surrender it as soon as practical. The Home Secretary can require the surrender of a card if it is possessed by someone other than the card holder, or the card has been cancelled, expired or is otherwise invalid or if the card is to be reissued or if was acquired invalidly.

Damage is taken to include the card or anything on it having become unreadable or unusable for any reason -- i.e. if the govt's card reader damages your card, YOU are obliged to report the fact.

Failure to surrender a card when ordered, or to notify the Home Secretary of the loss, damage, tampering with, destruction of or stealing of your card is an offence punishable by upto 51 weeks in prison.

Section 15 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those providing public services to require checking of the ID card before allowing access to those services.

Section 17 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those providing public services to access information on the NIR to verify a cardholder's identity.

Sections 27 to 31 make offences of:
  • possessing either false ID documents or the equipment for making false documents, with the intention of using the documents for enrolment, on pain of upto 10 years imprisonment.
  • possessing either false ID documents or equipment for making them without a reasonable excuse on pain of imprisonment for upto 5 years.
  • disclosing confidential NIR information without authorisation on pain of upto 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both,
  • providing false information to be included on the NIR or in order to modify information on the NIR. The offence carries upto 2 years in prison, or a fine or both.
  • tampering with the NIR, including any conduct making it more difficult or impossible for the NIR information to be retrieved (e.g. NIR operators going on strike?! The same operators making a mistake that causes a crash?!). The offence carries upto 10 years in prison, or a fine or both. See spy.org.uk's comments on this clause.

Monday, December 20, 2004

Charles Clarke's woolly defence of the govt's ID cards

Charles Clarke has written an article in The Times defending the govt's plans for identity cards. He claims that ID cards will prevent benefit fraud and help in the "War on Terror". However his claims do not stand up to scrutiny.

Take for example benefit fraud. He states:

Moreover, their help in tackling fraud will save tens of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money. Some £50 million a year is claimed illegally from the benefits systems using false identities. This money can be far better spent improving schools and hospitals and fighting crime and antisocial behaviour.
However according to the govt's own regulatory impact assessment (see clause 19):
The current best estimate is that the additional running costs of the new Agency to issue ID cards on a wider basis will be £85m pa when averaged over a ten year period. A further £50m pa is the estimate for the average cost over ten years of the verification service but this would not fall on the individual card holder.
Thus the system is already projected at costing more than twice as much as could possibly be saved from benefit fraud on the govt's own figures!

Later on, Clarke accuses critics of ID cards for woolly liberal thinking, and claims there will be no real cost in civil liberties:
I believe that some critics of our proposals are guilty of liberal woolly thinking and spreading false fears when they wrongly claim that ID cards will erode our civil liberties, will revisit 1984, usher in the “Big Brother” society, or establish some kind of totalitarian police state. Those kinds of nightmare will be no more true of ID cards, when they are introduced, than they have been for the spread of cash and credit cards, driving licences, passports, work security passes and any number of the other current forms of ID that most of us now carry.
This argument is quite flawed. The forms of ID we now carry are either entirely voluntary (e.g credit cards, ATM cards, loyalty cards) or linked to and limited to very specific purposes (e.g. driving licences, passports). One is not even required to carry any of them, and one needn't own any of them if one doesn't wish to drive or travel abroad. None of them are universal.

However the main points missed in the above argument are that:
  • On the govt's current plans, the ID cards would become a licence to live, revokable at the touch of button. Once the cards become compulsory the govt plans for them to be required for getting a job, accessing government services and accessing benefits. It is highly likely they'll also become necessary for opening bank accounts, taking out mortgages, getting credit cards and making major transactions. Clarke's article even suggests they might be used for renting videos. With so much of daily life tied to these cards, it will be impossible or at least very difficult to live without one. And given that they'll be tied to a central database with one entry per person, they could be rendered useless at the touch of a button by govt officials either deleting or flagging the database entry. This isn't an identity card, this is an internal passport.
  • According to the ID cards bill, the database entries will record all accesses for auditing purposes, thus every time you or your card is checked against the corresponding database entry, this fact will be recorded. Thus if a card check is required for accessing e.g. medical or educational services, this fact will be recorded in the database. Thus the ID card system will enable detailed recording of your everyday activities, more comprehensive than any store's loyalty card and compulsory to boot.
  • The ID card will facilitate all sorts of surveillance activity. If every resident has one by law, then the police merely need to ask for identification when people leave, e.g. political or religious meetings, protests, pubs, or any venue. Although carrying one won't be compulsory, the bulk of the law abiding population is likely (a) to carry it (because it is needed for so many things) (b) hand it over. And there's nothing to stop a future govt making it compulsory to carry.
It thus seems clear to me that the proposed system will form a powerful tool for social control and has very little to do with eliminating benefit fraud. However Clarke's claims that it will be useful for fighting terrorism, will help with identity fraud, and will even help prevent such tragedies as the death of the cocklers in Morecambe Bay, remain:
For example, a secure identity system will help to prevent terrorist activity, more than a third of which makes use of false identities. It will make it far easier to address the vile trafficking in vulnerable human beings that ends in the tragedies of Morecambe Bay, exploitative near-slave labour or vile forced prostitution. It will reduce identity fraud, which now costs the UK more than £1.3 billion every year.

Taking the £1.3 billion figure first. This figure comes from a report on identity fraud produced by the government a few years ago (see Annex B for the figures). However the figures contributing to this are not reliable, often included items that identity cards would do nothing to fight and were often based on guesswork. For example the figure was compiled, in part, on the assumption that 10% of VAT fraud (£215m out of £2.15billion) was due to identity fraud. The figures for credit card fraud (£370m) included card not present fraud e.g. for internet payments or payments over the phone. ID cards would have no impact on this. Why is the govt using such a dodgy figure to argue for a flagship piece of legislation?

As for the Morecambe Bay cocklers they were working illegally and off the books for companies that did not have scruples about employing illegal immigrants trafficked in from outside the country. How likely is it that such companies would ensure all their employees had ID cards? How likely is it that illegal workers would contact the authorities to register? The problem here was a lack of policing of employment/immigration, not a lack of identity cards. Unless the policing of these areas is increased the identity cards will make no difference.

Finally to the terrorists using multiple identities, it would appear that on Clarke's figures most terrorists (about two thirds of them) do not do so and therefore would not be affected by identity cards. Still disrupting the activities of the remaining third would be quite useful. But will the identity cards do this?

It is here that the discussion has to get down to some technical issues and the hurdles the identity cards system faces. The government is relying on biometric scans such as fingerprints and iris scans to prevent multiple identities being registered on the system for the same person. So, for example, when you enroll on the system your biometric scans will be compared with those already on the system to try and ensure you only get one identity on the system. Clearly allowing multiple identities will seriously undermine the ability of the system to deal with any of the problems above.

And this is where things fall down. Biometric scans are scans of living systems (people!) and multiple scans of the same part of the same person will not be identical. Moreover when comparing biometric scans one looks for closeness of match. Thus when deciding whether two scans match, one has to decide where to draw the line -- how close a match is good enough. Thus each biometric has associated with it a false match rate (the chance of two scans from different people matching) and false nomatch rate (the chance of two scans from the same person not matching). These typically have to be balanced off against each other to find a happy mean.

Now suppose you have a false match rate for a biometric of say 1 in a billion (higher than any I've seen claimed for existing biometrics -- typical claims range from 1 in 10000 to 1 in a few million). Note that this must include the possibility of operator error in using the machines, faulty machines and software errors. Suppose further that the database already has 20 million entries in it. There will be almost a 2% chance that a false match occurs. I.e. 1 in 50 people will register a false match, against a database of 20 million. And this figure will grow with each addition. The govt's plans would involves millions of people registering per year. For each million new people added, one can expect 20,000 (and growing) false matches on a database of 20 million people. Any system for dealing with these false matches and trying to ensure they're not attempts to fool the system into taking multiple identities are likely thus to get overwhelmed, they'll need to deal with 10s of thousands of false positives.

To add further doubt, this is a large IT system, one of the largest the govt will ever have attempted to produce. It's record with such systems (criminal records bureau, passport office, etc) is atrocious. Even the Police National Computer is shot full of errors!

As if that weren't enough, both fingerprints and iris scans have been shown to be forgeable. For example, fingerprints have been forged from prints left on a glass. And Iris scanners have been fooled by someone looking through a picture of an Iris with a hole cut out where the pupil lies. Admittedly the latter technique wouldn't be practical in most situations, but the lack of sophistication of the technique suggests, e.g. contact lenses printed with an Iris might actually fool the scanners.

At any rate, I'd expect those wishing to fool the system to use the long roll out to study the system and the scanners intently for weaknesses. Given government incompetence, the technical limitations of biometrics and the sheer ambition of what the govt's attempting, it seems to me quite clear that it'll be lucky if it makes any positive impact on fighting identity fraud or any other problem the govt has cited at all.

Does this mean we have nothing to worry about? Not quite. Most law abiding people will cooperate with the system, and the system may well thus "work" for this section of the population. Thus law abiding people will find themselves subjected to a licence to live, intrusive surveillance and a bureacracy capable of meddling in just about every area their lives thanks to the card. The criminals and terrorists won't.

The cards should be abandoned as a waste of resources from an anti-crime/anti-terrorism/anti-benefit fraud point of view and as a serious erosion of privacy and individual freedom otherwise.


Friday, July 30, 2004

Govt's information commissioner views ID card plan with "increasing alarm".

Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner has expressed "increasing alarm" at the govt's planned ID card scheme:

Plans for a national ID card scheme risk changing the relationship between the British state and its citizens, the information watchdog has warned.

Richard Thomas said he had initially greeted the plans with "healthy scepticism" but the details had changed his view to "increasing alarm".

One cogent point Thomas makes is that the scheme is not just about handing out cards to the population but about creating a detailed centralised database on every person in the country:

Mr Thomas told the MPs: "This is beginning to represent a really significant sea change in the relationship between state and every individual in this country."

It was now clear the scheme was not just about identity cards but about a national identity register, he said.

"It is not just about citizens having a piece of plastic to identify themselves.

"It's about the amount, the nature of the information held about every citizen and how that's going to be used in a wide range of activities."

Quite. The scheme is about creating the necessary apparatus for the government to keep tabs on us 24/7. And the government certainly seems keen on creating detailed databases of all and sundry when legislating in other policy areas.

Furthermore they seem keen on using blanket surveillance of the public's movements simply to introduce road charges:

The most radical vision for road pricing would see a satellite tracking-based system, with drivers charged variable rates per mile depending on how busy the route they used was.
They also back another blanket surveillance system for tackling drivers who drive away from petrol stations without paying:
For the stream of shoppers driving into the supermarket petrol station just outside Bradford, the CCTV camera has been such a familiar sight it may as well have been invisible.

But from this month, it is not just fuel-dodgers who the camera is there to monitor; up to 3,000 number plates an hour from the forecourt will now be fed into a police database.

This government clearly loves blanket surveillance of the public's doings (especially if linked into a database), and this extends to plans for recording who you phone, who you email, what websites you visit, and who phones/emails you or visits your website for a year for the authorities to be able to trawl.

Big Blunkett is watching you...

Sunday, July 25, 2004

Govt plans detailed database on every child (and their family)

Times Online - Newspaper Edition reports that the government plans to set up a national database containing confidential details about every child in Britain.

Each child under 18 years will be assigned a unique identifiying number and a central electronic register will hold information on a child's school achievements, GP and hospital visits, police and social services records and home address. The record will also include information about their families such as whether parents are separated or divorced and will identify problem relatives, including aunts and uncles who have a history of alcoholism or drug misuse.

Anyone who has access to this database will thus have considerable power over the lives of the children and (extended) families that are on it.

The database will also become a target for those who would like to use this information themselves, I predict a lucrative black market arising whereby corrupt officials and hackers will obtain such information for people for a fee.

It is also worth noting that once you have this database setup with childrens' details on it, you only need to wait 18 years (whilst keeping it up to date) and you'll have this information available for a large chunk of the adult population.

The government will thus have 2 routes on the go for creating detailed databases of everyone in the country, the national identity register associated with the national ID cards and the children's database.

And the criminal classes will get creative in thinking about how to get hold of and exploit the information now that it is stored neatly in one central location.

Police can keep DNA samples of innocent people

As noted on Samizdata, White Rose and the Spy.org.uk blog, and reported in The Telegraph, it has recently been ruled that the police can keep the DNA samples of those who are arrested and charged and who either had the charges dropped or were cleared in a subsequent trial. This upholds a change in the law introduced in 2001 to allow the police to retain DNA samples for use in "crime prevention or investigation".

Thus anyone who is arrested and charged can have their DNA samples taken and stored indefinitely, regardless of whether they're susbequently cleared or not thus entirely innocent people will have their DNA samples stored indefinitely by the police.

According to the Telegraph, Lord Brown said the only logical reason for objecting to samples being kept by the police was that it would make it easier for authorities to arrest someone if they ever offended in future.

This is quite simply false:

  • DNA samples contain potentially very sensitive medical information such as whether someone has a predisposition to certain diseases or may indeed suffer from a genetically caused disease. The storing of such samples by the police opens up opportunities for abuse of this information by corrupt/unscrupulous officers. By retaining the DNA of the innocent, you expose them this risk.
  • Retaining DNA samples will also open up opportunities to frame people by planting their DNA at the scene of a crime, knowing that their DNA is on file and likely to be checked. This possibility is not even restricted to unscrupulous officers. Anyone who knows that someone was arrested and charged for a crime will know that their DNA is likely to be on file as a result. Again another risk that the innocent accused would be exposed to.
  • DNA matching is not a fool-proof process. Problems such as contamination of samples, or erroneously labelling of samples can lead to false matches being reported. Those whose DNA has been stored will be subjected to these risks and may find themselves in the dock again as result.
  • As spy.org.uk points out, the retention of the DNA samples may even affect one's ability to get a job. Should an employer ask for an Enhanced Disclosure from the Criminal Records Bureau, they will be told that the police have some sort of record on you (though not the details). To assume that some employers won't hold this against you would be naive.
  • The fact that DNA samples can be retained indefinitely also gives the police the incentive to arrest and charged people as a means of expanding the DNA database, thus offering an incentive to arrest and charge people that has nothing to do with whether they're guilty of a crime or not.

The judge also argued that the DNA database should be expanded. According to the Telegraph:

In 2001, the law was changed to allow the police to keep a database of samples taken from suspects, though the retained samples may be used only in crime prevention or investigation.

Lord Brown said the benefits of this procedure were so manifest and the objections so threadbare that the cause of human rights would be better served by expanding the police database rather than by reducing it.

"The larger the database, the less call there will be to round up the usual suspects," he said. "Indeed, those amongst the usual suspects who are innocent will at once be exonerated."

But is this true? The larger the database the greater the probability of the following:

* human error leading to a false match leading to an innocent person in the dock

* a false match occuring due to limitations of the technology used in DNA profiling (there's a non-zero probability of a false match regardless of human error).

* that planting DNA at the scene of a crime will result in someone else being put in the frame.

* that someone gets put in the frame because they innocently left their DNA at the scene of a crime.

* that criminals will know that leaving DNA around is risky and will adapt their behaviour.

All of these will reduce the value of DNA evidence. Indeed suppose we were to create a DNA database of the entire population (ultimately taking samples at birth). Then a criminal could be certain of wasting police time by dropping randomly collected DNA at the scenes of his crimes, and taking steps to ensure he does not leave his own DNA there (will the police consider that none of the DNA samples they find at the scene of a crime come from the perpetrator?) .

Wednesday, April 28, 2004

"The Times" and identity cards

Yesterday's issue of The Times contained a couple of interesting articles in favour of identity cards, a commentary by Michael Gove and a leader column. The quotations below come from the paper copy, which I bought, as I didn't have the URLs at the time I wrote the original version of this article.

Gove article



Gove's article is ludicrously entitled "Why David Blunkett is the real civil libertarian", but maybe that merely shows Gove has a sense of humour. Gove starts off talking about prejudices, with his main point being that many people, understandably after the experiences of the 20th century, have a prejudice against the state exercising arbitrary authority.

He then argues that given the changed circumstances of the 21st century we may need to reexamine this prejudice where, in the west at least, the main threat to individuals comes not from state power as it did in the 20th century, but from terrorists who have the will and may get the means to carry out slaughter on a horrendous scale. He writes:

Well, the world has changed dramatically in the past three years, and my mind has changed too. I'm no longer convinced that the liberal prejudice against ID cards, or against incarceration without trial, is a wise presumption. And I'm no longer convinced that the progressive consensus which denounces David Blunkett as an illiberal populist for rethinking our civil liberties is actually all that progressive.

To take the last part of that first, I'd respond that Blunkett has not merely "rethought" civil liberites, he (and Straw before him and Howard before him) has set out to dismantle them plain and simple. A "rethinking" would not have attacked every single protection across the board. The right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, the right to security of property, freedom of expression, freedom of association, doctor-patient confidentiality, lawyer-client confidentiality, freedom from arbitrary surveillance, the right to protest, all of these have been sytematically eroded. Every year since 1999 (before 9/11!), the government has produced bills with swingeing attacks on civil liberties. Only a small proportion of them could possibly be justified on the grounds they may help protect us from terrorism. Even where such measures can protect us from terrorism they've often been applied broadly weakening protections when the authorities are investigating crime in general rather than just terrorism.

Also, at no point in his article does Gove justify his contention that civil libertarians who've opposed Blunkett are not "progressive".

But Gove has a point about incarceration without trial -- it can, if carefully used, help in the fight against terrorism by enabling the detention of terrorist suspects where a trial that revealed the evidence against them would compromise national security and seriously undermine the intelligence efforts needed to deal with such groups as al qaeda. And as Gove points out it is applied only to foreign residents, who cannot be deported and who are free to leave if they can find a country willing to take them. Thus the policy is inherently limited in scope, as well as having some legal oversight. However where its value in fighting terrorism is clear, I contend it is not at all clear that ID cards will have any such value. Also extending detention without trial to British citizens would remove this limit and leave everyone prey to being locked up by the state without being proven to have done anytthing wrong, at which point the terrorists will have ensured that our government has removed much of our freedom. As it is the existing law is not one we would want to have on the books permanently, only for so long as the threat from al qaeda is real.

A better solution might have been to reacquire the legal ability to deport foreign nationals to their country of origin, regardless of issues such as whether they might face the death penalty, and given that those individuals threaten national security. This was given up when we incorporated the ECHR into our laws, but we need not have incorporated it in the form which prevents this -- other countries have managed to incorporate it without compromising that ability.

The State and the Individual


Regarding the point about the state no longer being the main threat individuals face in the 21st century, I'll make several points. Firstly, to the extent this is so, it is largely due to the protections that people insisted on placing in the constitutions of western democracies after the experiences of despotism of earlier times -- and the 20th century is far from the only period of history to warn us about excessive statr power and due to the cultural commitment to freedom in the west. The removal of those protections will expose people again to such dangers and may also both reflect and magnify a decline in the cultural commitment to freedom in western countries.

Secondly, even in western countries since WWII there have been times when governments have abused their powers over their citizens, or where citizens have fallen foul of the state. Think of all the miscarriages of justice, the West Midlands Serious Crime squad, the Watergate scandal, police beatings of suspects or protestors, etc. Whilst more the exception than the rule thankfully, such things do occur and demonstrate that democracy and a constitution that protects individual rights only reduce rather than eliminate the threat the state can pose to its citizens.

Thirdly, terrorists have yet to kill on a scale that states routinely manage when they go to war or decide to murder their own citizens en mass, though I suspect they would if they could and felt it would further their aims.

One might also ask what is the point of resisting being enslaved by terrorists only to be enslaved by our governments when they tear down civil liberties in the name of fighting terrorism? A government that succeeds in doing that may pose a more serious and long term threat than the terrorists.

Gove further writes:

"But I am increasingly exasperated with those civil libertarians who jeer at his proposals, while refusing to recognise the problem and conspicuously failing to offer any alternative."

The problem Gove is forgetting here is that Blunkett has been attacking civil liberties so outrageously and relentlessly that no one trusts him, and the civil libertarians are continuously on the defensive against this that and the other attack Blunkett proposes. There is barely time to catch breath and take stock of one policy that attacks if not removes a civil liberty, before Blunkett throws up another, if not 10 more.

But Gove has a point with this comment: civil libertarians do need to say how they would deal with the terrorist threat if they're to oppose Blunketts proposals more effectively than they've managed hitherto. It is time to go on the offensive, to point out the shortcomings of Blunkett's proposals when considered purely as means of dealing with terrorism, to put forward alternatives that preserve civil liberties and, yes where necessary, acknowledge that some proposals from Blunkett may actually help in fighting terrorism at the expense of erosions of civil liberties and there may need to be concessions. Unfortunately Blunkett's all-out assault on civil liberties has led to a situation where civil libertarians have been reacting to him, and grown to mistrust him (for good reasons), giving an appearance of knee-jerk opposition rather than trying to set an agenda where civil liberties can be discussed more calmly and are more likely to be preserved whilst dealing with the threat from terrorism. IMHO Blunkett has exploited the situation to destroy civil liberties, not to "rethink" or try to preserve them.

Gove and ID cards


And so to Gove on ID cards:

An ID card system will make it easier to identify those at liberty in this country who are here illegally. It would make it easier to deport those who have broken the law, easier to police access to services funded by the taxpayer and by showing that we could defend our borders, easier to defend the principle of managed migration.

Checking abuse of the asylum system could also help to choke off a route for terrorist activity. Past supporters of terrorism have chosen to claim asylum here, then disappeared from scrutiny the better to further their goals. Allowing the police to request ID papers would not , of course, stop terrorist activity but it could play a significant part in frustrating it.


If I believed ID cards could achieve all this, I might support ID cards myself or at least grant they could help and thus concede a need to balance the dangers of ID cards against such tangible benefits. But it is all mere assertion by Gove. He offers neither evidence nor argument to back up these claims. And I've yet to see any such evidence or argument offered by any other proponent of ID cards whether it's the government, or columnists in any of our media, or even posters to uk.politics.misc.

Moreover, there is considerable evidence to suggest they will not make the differences made above. Most of the EU have national ID cards, yet they all suffer from the same problems with illegal immigration, crime and even terrorism (Spain's problems with terrorism occur despite the presence of a compulsory ID card) as we do, as this report from Privacy International makes clear.

Surely any civil libertarian must demand that a weakening of civil liberties has demonstratable tangible benefits before conceding ground and allowing the protections of the citizen from arbitrary state power to be eroded?

Sadly, Blunkett has steam-rollered many of his proposals through in the face of objections and without explaining what the benefits are and how the proposals will ahcieve the benefits claimed. That is why it is ludicrous to try and paint Blunkett as "the real civil libertarian".

Leader column


Finally the leader column in the same issue, cautiously supports the experiments with ID cards and attacks some of the arguments raised against them. E.g.

Britain unusually has not issued any [ID cards] since wartime documentation --- a point of pride for some citizens who believe that they have the freedom to choose the information they share with the state.

To worry about losing this is understandable. Yet the belief is quaintly anachronistic It fails to recognise the ways in which the world has already changed as computerisation diminishes privacy. Any individual who pays for hhis shopping with a credit card or makes phone calls from a mobile leaves detailed records of his life. The introduction of an ID card would make it easier for officials to join the dots of this digital information -- it should also mean that opening a bank account or any other official transaction becomes simpler.


Firstly, there is a difference between leaving information with private organisations, in voluntary transactions that give us clear benefit and the state demanding and recording as much information it can about us. In the former situation, the information is held in a fragmentary manner across multiple institutions and we have the choice not to use the services and therefore not to divulge the information if we wish. These factors limit the dangers from having such information recorded -- though the dangers are yet such that we need data protection laws and they should probably be strengthened. One might add too that using an unregistered pay as you go phone only leaves anonymous records of your activities.

Secondly, this passage reveals one of the dangers of the ID cards, the centralisation of the information and the ability to connect all the information together at one point. A national ID card will facilitate such centralisation by the state and thus give the sate considerable power over individuals because it will know their detailed activities. "Joining the dots" is precisely what is difficult at the moment and what an ID card with an associated central database would enable -- though admittedly other trends are making joining the dots easier independently of ID cards. Still an ID card would magnify the dangers we already face from lax attitudes towards the data we leave around. It would also become a licence to live, in that without an ID card it would become impossible to lead one's every day life. This licence will be revocable by state officials at any time for any reason they deem fit.

Regarding the claims that ID cards may be ineffective for fighting crime and terrorism made by civil libertarians, the leader states:

The temptation of them is to propose absurdly contradictory arguments namely: a) "they" will know all about you all of the time; and b) "they" will inevitably get the technology wrong

Certainly, people doubt the cards on the basis of government incompetence with computer schemes, but the contradiction above is more apparent than real.

It can be the case that the cards enable the governemnt to exert more social control over generally law abiding citizens, including enabling surveillance of everyday acitvities and be the case that the cards can be easily circumvented, due to govt incompetence or any other factors you might name, by terrorists, criminals illegal immigrants and anyone else who wishes to avoid the inconvenineces the cards might cause.

The point is that the law abiding majority will tend to cooperate with the system for fear of punishment and expose themselves to such surveillance and other potential abuses of the system whilst those who have no qualms about breaking the law will subvert the system to their own ends.

Thus the state incompetence or inability to actually control would be terrorists and criminals and the odd clever civil libertarian via the system does not transfer to the state's ability to control the law abiding majority with the system. The cynical might suggest that controlling the majority is the whole point, whilst crime fighting and dealing with terrorism are just the sales packaging.

Monday, April 26, 2004

The govt ID card: a licence to live

As reported in much of the media, the government has finally unveiled draft legislation and a consultation for its long trailed identity card scheme. The government envisages these cards becoming compulsory to own by 2013 and that the cards would be needed to obtain access to public services and benefits.

The draft legislation and consultation document are available here. I will do a detailed dissection of this later. For now, I wish to make a few points that form the basis of my opposition to this scheme.

The identity card proposed by the government, far from merely being a useful form of identity, will in effect be a licence to go about your daily life, revocable at any time by the government. Once in full swing, you will not be able to use state services without it, you will not be able to work legally without it, you'll find it difficult if not impossible to go about many day to day activities without it.

Whether the police have the power to demand it or not will be a side issue compared to the need to use it to account for yourself to anyone in officialdom who demands it, simply in order to get on with your life.

Activities such as opening bank accounts, obtaining mortgages, getting credit cards or even just carrying out large financial transactions will all require it. And the government and the officials running the system could wipe your identity (effectively making you a non-person), or brand you as a criminal or terrorist, in a manner that would affect every aspect of your life, at the press of a few buttons.

Accepting these identity cards will thus mean giving the government a level of power over you akin to that of a master over his slave, and the proposed charges for these cards will effectively be a poll tax -- a tax on mere existence.

The relationship between the citizen and the state will be fundamentally altered. Instead of the former being the servant of the latter (admittedly, we fall far short of this ideal as it stands), the state will assert its authority over the citizen via these cards and their associated databases.

The cards will facilitate the state extending its control over citizens into their everyday activities in a way not yet seen, though hinted at with the existing controversies over data protection and surveillance of online communications.

It will also be a lot more convenient and easy for the state to note who is doing what, where and when because it can all be easily tied to a central identity database linking individuals' activities across time and space.

The govt wants us to have this card for the much same reason the farmer wants to brand his sheep.

Make no mistake -- these cards will be a tool of social control used by the state. Combined with modern information technology, it will enable a new level of individuated discrimination by the state and a level of state surveillance of individual actions unseen before. The govt wants us to have this card for the much same reason the farmer wants to brand his sheep.

Saturday, November 15, 2003

ID cards and biometrics

Fiona McTaggart, a govt minister and former chairwoman of Liberty, defends ID cards in a Guardian article. An excellent rebuttal can be found at spy.org.uk's blog, and the Guardian's letters section also contains some excellent points. An interesting section from the spy.org.uk rebuttal is this:

Here we go again, the repetition of the false claim that biometrics are somehow unique. Not even the people with a vested commercial interest in selling the technology dare to make that claim. Your "biometric characteristics" may be reasonably individual to you personally, but that is not the same as saying that what ends up inside a Smart Card or database is "unique" or "unforgeable".

The specious reasoning goes along the lines of: if your Smart ID Card ever gets lost or stolen, there would be no need to worry, since, for example your fingerprint biometric would make it impossible for anybody else to use it, thereby crushing Identity Theft.

Leaving aside the statistics of False Positives, False Negatives, and the small percentage of people with no usable biometric at all (tens of thousands in a population of 60 million) the fact is that you leave your fingerprints all over your ID Card. There is a very high probability (around 80%) that latent fingerprints taken off your ID Card could be used to construct a "false finger" which is sufficient to fool the finger print scanner.


Emphasis added. The point here is that biometric identifiers are compared with each other in a manner that is probabilistic. The higher the number of data points compared, the more certain you can be that a match is a real match but the less certain you can be that you'll get a match. Thus you have to trade off the false positives, getting a match on biometrics from 2 different people, against the false negatives, failing to detect that two biometric readings are from the same person.

Now if someone claims that they've got a false positive rate for a particular biometric system, of 1 in a billion this might sound like it will give real certainty and allow a national identity register to be created in a manner that prevents people from applying from multiple identities. They'd reason that in a population of 60million, a 1 in a billion chance of a false positive is safe. They'd be wrong.

To compare every person's biometric with every other person's biometric (as would be required to create the database in this manner) would involve (60,000,000 times 59,999,999)/2 = 1,799,999,970,000,000
comparisons. For each comparison there's 1 billionth of a chance of getting a false positive. You'd therefore expect
1799999.97 of those comparisons to return a false positive match. That's roughly 1.8million false positive matches. Note that that does not involve 1.8million people, but rather 1.8million comparisons.

In other words, you can guarantee that there will be a large number of false positive matches as the database is assembled. Without a means of determining whether a positive match is a true or false positive, you won't be able to prevent people from creating multiple identities on the system. Worse, if you concentrate on getting such a low false positive rate, the false negative rate is likely to shoot up, making if even more likely that if someone did try to get multiple identities on the system, their attempt would not even show up as a positive match. And note that the false positive rate needs to cover software glitches, hardware glitches and human error too. Also, if you double the size of the population you roughly quadruple the number of comparisons.

It seems to me that without a solution to this, the idea that a national ID card can provide a secure and reliable means of verifying identity is simply a mirage.

Wednesday, August 20, 2003

More on the DNA database

For those who read my blog on the Scottish Police Federation's outcry against requiring recruits to submit DNA samples for the national database, don't get me wrong. I do think DNA fingerprinting is a useful tool and I do not object to DNA testing of suspects during the investigation of crime, especially serious crime.

What I object to is the permanent storing, without consent, of DNA samples collected from suspects and volunteers regardless of whether they get convicted of a crime or not. This amounts to placing members of the general public under permanent suspicion regardless of whether they have a criminal record or not. And, as the Scottish Police Federation realise, those who have their DNA samples on the database are at risk of being framed for crime by those who'd abuse the system. The SPF's objections when the police are demanded to give DNA samples, provide a stark contrast to the normally enthusiastic pronouncements of police spokesmen when the general public are demanded to give such samples.

Also, if samples can be permanently retained once given, regardless of whether a suspect or volunteer has been convicted or gives consent, this provides an incentive for the police and the authorities who maintain the database to get samples from people purely in order to have them on the database, and thus to arrest and charge people of a crime simply to get their DNA sample or to intimidate people into giving "voluntary" DNA samples. Those who think I'm being paranoid should take a look at this article from a local Sunderland newspaper:

Hundreds of men living on Seaham's Westlea estate are to be tested after DNA, believed to be that of the attacker, was recovered from the crime scene. Police say they will "look closely" at anyone who refuses to take the DNA test.

And:

The screening will take us a major step nearer to finding the person responsible," said Det Chief Insp Brian Tait, leading the investigation. He added: "Everyone who takes part will do so as a volunteer, but we would certainly look closely at the reasons offered by any individual who refused to help".

Thus refusing to take the supposedly voluntary DNA test will ensure the police "look closely" at you. In this atmosphere, it appears that every man in a certain age group must give a test (and thus be permanently on the database) or be treated as highly suspicious at best, despite the fact they claim to be searching for an attacker with certain characteristics:

The man being hunted is thin, about six feet tall and was wearing a dark mask, dark top with hood and slightly lighter coloured trousers.

As a result, a large chunk of the male population of Seaham's Westlea estate are about to have their DNA on the database permanently, and under some pressure, despite having committed no crime, and not being convicted or even being charged with a crime.

Of course, the police are investigating serious crime here -- the rapes of 2 elderly women. Of course if they have good reason to suspect someone of committing the crime they should be able to do a DNA test as part of the investigation. But what is actually happening, I grant most probably through the best intentions of the police to solve this crime, is that a large number of men will be tested and their DNA permanently stored, even though they had nothing to do with the crime.

The sad thing is that the actual culprit now has a strong incentive to leave the area to avoid this publicised exercise in DNA collecting. Of course there's no guarantee that if DNA samples had to be destroyed if the subject is released without charge or is acquitted, the police wouldn't do a blanket testing like this. However the incentive to do so is greater with the permanent storage of even voluntary samples, and it appears that the police are pressurising every man they ask in this "voluntary" exercise to give a sample or else. And for those who want everyone's DNA on the database these sorts of exercises provide a means of achieving this goal incrementally by stealth, as well as softening people up for the time when they make it compulsory.

Sunday, August 17, 2003

Scottish police "outrage" over demand for their DNA

The Scotland on Sunday newspaper reports that plans to require all new recruits to hand over DNA samples for a national database have led to a rebellion amongst Scottish police officers. This is in stark contrast to the enthusiasm usually shown by police spokesmen (e.g. see comments towards the end of this article) for plans to collect and retain the DNA samples of the general public without requiring us to be charged or convicted of an offence.

Surely the Scottish Police Federation has nothing to hide and therefore nothing to fear from this? At least that's the usual line taken when such measures are proposed for the public, but the slogan "nothing to hide, nothing to fear" is a slogan for fools. It assumes the innocent have nothing to hide, and implicitly assumes the authorities can always be trusted.

The Scotland on Sunday article does point out various dangers of having all recruits donate samples to this database, but surely these dangers equally apply to collecting and retaining samples from the public?

NB according to the article, since last summer new recruits south of the border already have to hand over DNA samples.